


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Extract from the Staff Meeting Minutes of 12 July 1978:

.25X1A



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000700040013-0

REFERENCE COPY

RETURN TO OS REGISTRY

FROM:

Assistant Legislative Counsel

EXTENSION

6604

NO.

DATE 27 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Director of Security

Attached is a recent letter from Senator Goldwater and my proposed response for the Director's signature. Please let me have any comments by COB today if possible as this is due to the Director by COB tomorrow.

25X1A

DRAFT

Washington, D.C. 20505

Honorable Barry Goldwater
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Barry:

I appreciate the concern expressed in your 19 July letter regarding the leak to Seymour Hersh of the New York Times involving the Committee's report on Angola. Leaks of sensitive information have indeed been a problem for all recent Administrations and Congresses, but it is my hope that President Carter's strong stand and personal involvement in trying to stop leaks will have a significant impact.

Our analysis of the Hersh story apparently differs a bit from the Committee's. There are certainly significant inaccuracies in the story, strongly suggesting that Hersh did not see the report itself, but rather was told of its contents. Yet the fundamental allegation in the report that Congress was repeatedly misinformed about the Angolan covert action program is accurately characterized. It would be interesting to know whether the discussion of hiring mercenaries, which appears in the Times story, but not in the final version of the report, was the subject of Committee discussions or appeared in drafts of the report. Since this topic was not in the report disseminated to CIA and the President, the leak of this information could not have come from the Executive Branch.

As with most of these leaks, it is difficult to identify the responsible party or parties, as one would surmise that those responsible would take steps to hide their identity, as by leaking the information only after it had been disseminated to others. It should be noted that the key period when the report was disseminated to the Executive Branch was also the period when the report was given final approval by the full Committee, and was presumably available to all 19 Members and 40 or 50 staff members. Regarding Executive Branch handling of the report, it has received very limited dissemination. The copy sent to me was seen by only about 10 people at the Agency--those employees in the Office of Legislative Counsel and Operations Directorate responsible for analyzing the report. Most of these employees did not see it until after Mr. Hersh had the story. The copy sent to the President was held by a senior staff member of the National Security Council pending resolution of the differences between the Committee and the Agency regarding the report.

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This copy was not xeroxed or otherwise disseminated to Ambassador Young or any others in the Administration.

As I have stated to the full Committee, the recent spate of leaks, some of them unquestionably from elements of the Congress, can only seriously hamper our efforts to provide vital intelligence to the nation's policy-makers in both the Executive Branch and Congress. I know you share my dismay over these leaks, and I look forward to your cooperation in combatting this problem.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

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RETURN TO OS REGISTRY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM				
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP				
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS	
1	Director of Security			
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		XX INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:				
OS 8 1993				
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER				
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE	
EO/DDA			7/24	
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FORM NO.
1-67

237

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DDA

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A		X		
7	DD/O		X		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC	X			
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	PA		X		
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	DCI/SS				
19					
20					
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22					

SUSPENSE DATE: 28 July 1978

Remarks:

To 10: Please develop DCI response. You may wish to raise at the 24 July 1600 Staff Meeting.

25X1A

21 July 78
Date

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES
TACTICAL AIR POWER SUBCOMMITTEE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE
AVIATION
COMMUNICATIONS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
VICE CHAIRMAN

July 19, 1978

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

78-5991

OS/A Registry

78-6749/2

Dear Stan:

We have shared the concern which you have voiced to our Committee on several occasions about leaks and thus were disappointed to see a story in the New York Times written by Seymour Hersh, which purports to deal with the Committee's report on Angola.

We have analyzed his story and find he has not made one correct statement about the content of the report, although someone did suggest the general idea of one point that was made.

Although the story does not appear to contain classified information, we were disappointed to see such extensive quotations attributed to members of our Committee and officials of the CIA.

I might point out, however, that we dealt with this issue for over a year without a single breach of security, but we began receiving questions about it from Mr. Hersh within hours from the time it was disseminated to the Executive Branch.

I have heard disturbing reports that the White House allowed fairly wide distribution, including a copy to Ambassador Young, who, reportedly, discussed it with many people.

In this regard, you might, if you can, try to find out if it was xeroxed and, if it was, who were the people who received it. I still think the White House staff is a constant source of leaks just as it has been through every administration I have lived with during these twenty-five years.

With best wishes,


Barry

Barry Goldwater

OS 8 1993

REFERENCE COPY

DDA 18 1749
Background

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Deputy Director of Security 4E 60 Hqs	25 JUL 1978	<i>[Signature]</i>
2	DD/PTM.		
3			
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6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: Sid: Attached is an extract from the staff meeting of 12 July 1978 which should be worked in to the paper you are preparing for the Director to send to the President. <div style="text-align: center;">  John F. Blake </div> Att			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Deputy Director for Administration 7D 24 Hqs, x5454			25 Jul 78
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